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How can the incapacity defence in contract law coexist with the concept of universal legal capacity 
advanced by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)? In the absence of 
clear guidance from the CRPD on the link between legal capacity and mental capacity, and given the 
silence of this Convention on the concept of contractual capacity, this article stresses the need to 
redefine contractual capacity in a manner that responds not only to economic interests (eg upholding 
the security of transactions) but also to social interests (including the protection of values such as 
dignity). The discussion insists that incapacity and disability must never be conceptually equated and 
calls for a definition of contractual incapacity that moves beyond the medical condition of individuals 
(whether this is known by or apparent to the other contracting party) and which considers the 
circumstances of the transaction. These arguments are explored in the context of English contract 
law, focusing on the question of contractual validity when a party lacked the mental capacity to 





Entering into legally binding agreements with others is instrumental in advancing one’s personhood.1 
As recognised in Article 12 CRPD,2 all persons have a right to equal recognition as persons before the 
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1 G. Quinn, ‘Personhood and Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of Article 12 CRPD’ (HPOD 
Conference, Harvard, 2010). 
2 G.A. Res. 61/611, 13 December 2006, A/61/611, 15 IHRR 255. 
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law3 and to the equal enjoyment of legal capacity in all aspects of life.4 Implied in this provision is the 
equal right to enter into legally binding agreements and to have these recognised. Article 12 CRPD 
has the potential to play a significant contribution in tackling the historical disadvantage and the 
barriers to participation in society faced by persons with disabilities in general and persons with 
cognitive disabilities in particular.5 Such disadvantages include legal barriers when disability is 
equated with incapacity, leading to a denial of legal capacity and the institution of guardianship 
systems and substituted decision making.6 These reflect a perception of people as objects of care for 
whom decisions must be made, rather than as subjects of human rights who may require support in 
making their own decisions.7 The denial of legal capacity has been equated with the ‘civil death’ of 
the persons concerned.8 Persons whose decisions have no legal force are left without the 
opportunity to make their own choices and depend instead on the actions of others.9 They are 
denied their individuality and are deprived of their personal autonomy and dignity,10 becoming ‘non-
persons’ under the law.11 By recognising the right of persons with disabilities to enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others, Article 12 CRPD provides persons with a ‘sword’ to advance their 
individual wishes and with a ‘shield’ against unwanted interference from others.12 In addition, by 
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acknowledging that some persons with disabilities may require support in exercising legal capacity,13 
Article 12 CRPD recognises the interdependence between people.14 This provision embodies the 
ethos of the CRPD for the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by 
everybody15 and has the potential to engender significant transformations within the legal 
frameworks of States Parties,16 although the scope of Article 12 CRPD remains unclear and its 
implementation will prove challenging.17 Referring to the absence of a clear demarcation between 
the concepts of legal capacity and mental capacity, Bartlett rightly notes that ‘an awkward silence’ 
remains at the heart of the CRPD.18  
 
Whilst considerable academic discussion regarding the implementation challenges posed by Article 
12 CRPD involve the medical context,19 this article explores the concept of capacity in a contractual 
context focusing on English contract law. Although the United Kingdom has ratified the CRPD in 2009, 
this Convention is not incorporated into domestic law and would prove of limited direct assistance in 
domestic courts. In R (on the application of NM) v Islington LBC,20 Sales J. notes that the CRPD is ‘an 
unincorporated international treaty’ which ‘does not have direct effect in English law’,21 while in R 
(on the application of MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,22 Laws LJ warns that ‘some 
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caution is required as regards the use to be made of unincorporated international conventions’.23 
Yet, even if the CRPD is not incorporated into domestic law, its relevance as an instrument ratified by 
the United Kingdom cannot be overlooked. At stated by Carnwath LJ in AH v West London Mental 
Health Trust,24 ‘[b]y ratifying a Convention a state undertakes that wherever possible its laws will 
conform to the norms and values that the Convention enshrines’.25 The recognition of universal legal 
capacity in the CRPD26 and its emphasis on upholding values such as the protection of human 
dignity27 raise important questions about the impact of the CRPD for the incapacity defence in 
contract law. Whilst this defence is deemed compatible with the CRPD if it can be invoked by anyone 
and the concepts of incapacity and disability are not equated,28 the Convention does not provide 
guidance on the definition or scope of the incapacity defence. This article suggests that to be 
compatible with the CRPD ethos, any examination of the incapacity defence in contract law must 
consider not only economic factors (such as the security of transactions), but also social factors 
(including the protection of values such as dignity). This requires a move beyond the medical 
condition of the party alleging incapacity (and whether this was known by, or apparent to the other 
contracting party), to also assess environmental factors (such as the circumstances of the 
transaction). The article seeks to demonstrate why such an approach is necessary and explores how 
this could be accommodated within the parameters of English contract law.  
 
The article focuses on the common law approach regarding the validity of a contract between a party 
who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction (hereafter A) and another party who 
was unaware of the incapacity and acted in good faith (hereafter B). The reasons for focusing on this 
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issue are twofold. Firstly, whilst recognising the significance of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 200529 
in defining capacity,30 its relevance for contracts for necessary goods and services31 and the potential 
influence of this definition beyond such contracts,32 it is important to also recognise the potential 
influence that the common law can have on the way in which capacity-related issues are addressed 
at statutory level. In fact, as recognised by Andrews J. in Aster Healthcare v Shafi,33 the economic 
focus reflected in section 7 MCA (regarding contracts for necessary goods and services) is rooted on 
the common law rule on necessaries and its concern for upholding the security of transactions.34 This 
may suggest that the insufficient emphasis on social values (including concern for protecting dignity) 
reflected in the common law approach was replicated at statutory level. Any attempt to 
reconceptualise contractual capacity to reflect both economic and social values should not rely solely 
on top down measures which would reform the MCA to reflect CRPD values, but should also call for a 
revolution from within, in which the common law approach to the incapacity defence reflects such 
values and moves beyond a focus on the medical conditions of individuals to consider the 
circumstances of the transaction.  
 
Secondly, questions regarding the validity of a contract between A and B raise important policy 
issues, as they may require courts to make a choice between two innocents. An extreme approach 
would provide absolute protection to one of these parties and disregard the interests of the other.35 
At one end of the spectrum, such contracts would always be void, to safeguard A’s interests.36 At the 
other end of the spectrum, such contracts would always be valid, to protect B’s interests and uphold 
                                                          
29 Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9 [hereafter MCA]. 
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Position’ (2015) 74 CLJ 145. 
36 G. Spark, Vitiation of Contracts: International Contractual Principles and English Law (Cambridge: CUP 2013), 
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the security of transactions. While early English law had witnessed a shift from the former extreme37 
to the latter (Beverley’s case),38 nineteenth century English law attempted to provide a more 
balanced stance.39 The prevalent approach, outlined in Moulton v Camroux40 and reinforced in 
Imperial Loan v Stone41 (Imperial Loan) allows such contracts to be voidable if A can prove both that 
he lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction and that B knew about the incapacity.42 
Despite attempts to find a middle ground,43 this is an imbalanced approach which sets the bar too 
high for A, as it seems to insist on B’s actual knowledge of the mental incapacity. Twentieth century 
contract law witnessed an attempt by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Archer v Cutler44 (Archer) 
to shift the balance in A’s favour, by stating that an unfair agreement could be invalidated for want of 
mental capacity, irrespective of B’s knowledge of the incapacity.45 Despite the merits of providing A 
with an additional tool to invalidate a contract on grounds of incapacity, this perspective is also 
imbalanced, as it overlooks B’s interests. This approach was ultimately rejected by the Privy Council 
in Hart v O'Connor,46 which confirmed the rule in Imperial Loan and criticised Archer for being 
‘illogical’.47 The twenty-first century decision of the Supreme Court in Dunhill v Burgin48 (Dunhill) 
provides hope that a balanced approach can be adopted, although this matter is far from being 
settled. The hope for a balanced approach is pinned on Lady Hale’s confirmation that B’s knowledge 
of incapacity required in Imperial Loan is not limited to actual knowledge and can also include 
constructive knowledge.49 Yet, Lady Hale’s dictum in Dunhill has been met with some reservation by 
academic commentators, who question the basis and scope of such an extension of the grounds for 
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invalidating contracts for want of capacity.50 This article calls for a wide interpretation of 
‘constructive knowledge’ that considers the circumstances of the transaction and protects not only 
economic interests but also social values, including dignity. The discussion considers competing 
policies and reflects on the relevance of social values in a context dominated by economic interests. 
 
The CRPD and the concepts of universal human dignity and universal capacity 
 
The CRPD and Article 12 have been the subject of extensive academic scrutiny.51 This discussion 
focuses on the need to ensure that any attempt to address implementation challenges associated 
with Article 12 CRPD must be guided by a framework of principles that reflect citizenship values 
(including the protection of human dignity) and assesses how these values can inform our 
understanding of contractual capacity. 
 
The Convention, which is the first binding international human rights instrument focused specifically 
on the rights of persons with disabilities,52 reframes the interest of persons with disabilities in terms 
of human rights53 and reflects a perception of people as subjects of human rights (rather than as 
objects of care),54 will full entitlements in society (rather than disempowered victims).55 It 
emphasises the equal worth of all human beings, aims to ensure ‘full and equal enjoyment of all 
                                                          
50 J. Chitty et.al (eds), Chitty on Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 32nd edn, 2015); E. Peel, Treitel on the 
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Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Brill 2009); E Flynn, From Rhetoric 
to Action: Implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CUP 2011). On Article 12 
CRPD, see Bartlett, above n 18; P. Gooding, ‘Navigating the ‘Flashing Amber Lights’ of the Right to Legal 
Capacity in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Responding to Major 
Concerns’ (2015) 15 H.R.L.Rev. 45; A. Arstein-Kerslake and E. Flynn, ‘The General Comment on Article 12 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Roadmap for Equality Before the Law’ (2016) 20 Intl J 
Hum Rts 471. 
52 Kanter, n 11 above, p 288. 
53 R Kayess and P French, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 8 H.R.L.Rev. 1. See CRPD, Art 1. 
54 Lawson, above n 6, p 584. See CRPD Art 12(1). 
55 D. Smith, ‘Who Says You're Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Definition of Disability’ (2007) 
82 Tul.L.Rev. 1, 71. 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities and to promote respect for 
their inherent dignity’56 and calls for ‘respect for difference’ and for the ‘acceptance of persons with 
disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity’.57 The Convention tackles human rights abuses 
experienced by persons with disabilities, including the denial of legal capacity on the basis of 
disability58 and adapts the application of established human rights to circumstances particular to 
persons with disabilities.59 It reaffirms the move away from a medical model of disability (focused on 
the medical condition of individuals) to a predominantly social model that perceives disability as a 
socially-constructed phenomenon,60 resulting from ‘the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others’.61 It focuses on adapting society to 
accommodate various abilities rather than on adapting individuals to society62 and perceives social 
inclusion and respect for individual autonomy as mutually complementary goals.63  
 
Persons with disabilities are often confronted by other people’s misconceptions about disability, 
resulting in a ‘misrecognition’ of their identity.64 The CRPD provides a framework for change from 
misrecognition to recognition, promoting respect for human diversity.65 The citizenship value of 
human dignity plays a key role in achieving this objective, as it is inherent in every person and its 
recognition aims to ensure that ‘everyone is treated as having value or worth’.66 It contributes 
towards ensuring substantive equality, which proactively tackles ‘systemic’ forms of discrimination 
                                                          
56 CRPD, Art 1. 
57 Ibid, Art 3(d). 
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59 Kayess and French, above n 53, p 3. 
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63 H. Bielefeldt, ‘New Inspiration for the Human Rights Debate: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2007) 52 NQHR 397, p 398. 
64 H. Hanish, ‘Recognising Disability’, in J. Bickenbach et.al. (eds.) Disability and the Good Human Life (CUP, 
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entrenched in society.67 Closely linked to universal human dignity is the concept of universal legal 
capacity, which refers to the ability of all people to hold and exercise rights and duties.68 These 
concepts should be interpreted in light of each other,69 recognising their overlap in the pursuit of 
respect for everyone. The key for ensuring a clear understanding of these concepts is through social 
dialogue,70 including consultation with disabled people’s user led organisations. 
 
Article 12 CRPD, which reaffirms the right of people with disabilities to equal recognition as persons 
before the law71 and to the equal enjoyment of legal capacity in all aspects of life,72 has been has 
been commended as ‘the beating heart of the Convention’,73 with the potential to ‘effect 
revolutionary changes’.74 It plays a key contribution to the paradigm shift in the perception of 
persons with disabilities from objects of care to subjects of rights,75 from substituted decision-making 
and denial of legal capacity to supported decision-making and the recognition of the right of persons 
with disabilities to enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others76 and from exclusion to 
inclusion in all aspects of life.77 It refers explicitly to, inter alia, the equal right of persons with 
disabilities to control their own financial affairs and to have access to financial credit.78 It also 
recognises that some people may require support in exercising legal capacity79 and calls for 
safeguards to prevent abuse (eg undue influence) in the provision of support.80 While the adoption 
of Article 12 represents a victory for persons with disabilities, the practical implications of 
                                                          
67 Ibid, p 154. 
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69 For similar arguments regarding the concepts of dignity, equality and liberty, see S. Baer, ‘Dignity, Liberty, 
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71 CRPD, Art 12(1). 
72 Ibid. Art 12(2). See Dhanda, above n 17, 457; Dhanda, above n 6, 46-48. 
73 Nilsson, above n 6, p 14. 
74 Lawson, above n 6, p 595. 
75 CRPD, Arts 1 and 12(1). 
76 Ibid, Art 12(2) and (3). 
77 Melish, above n 58, p 9. 
78 CRPD, Art 12(5). 
79 Ibid, Art 12(3). 
80 Ibid, Art 12(4). 
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implementing this provision suggest that ‘the hard part begins!’81 This difficulty is augmented when 
considering the implications of universal legal capacity in the area of contract law, given the silence 
of the Convention regarding its application in the contractual sphere and the absence of guidance 
from the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ComRPD) on the link between legal, 
mental and contractual capacity. However, despite this silence, the CRPD has the potential to be a 
benchmark in guiding a re-examination of legal concepts such as contractual capacity in light of the 
values pursued by the Convention, including dignity. 
 
The implementation of Article 12 CRPD would not require an abandonment of the incapacity defence 
in contract law. In fact, in a framework which recognises universal legal capacity (the ability 
possessed by everyone to hold and exercise rights and duties)82 and distinguishes this from mental 
capacity (the decision making skills of an individual, which vary from person to person and may be 
influenced by external factors),83 the exercise of universal legal capacity could be facilitated by an 
effective legal framework where parties can rely, when appropriate, on defences such as contractual 
incapacity. However, the effectiveness of the incapacity defence in contract law depends on a range 
of factors. Bach rightly notes that as the incapacity defence in contract law may be invoked by 
anyone, this defence is compatible with Article 12 CRPD, but incompatibility would arise if incapacity 
and disability were conceptually equated.84 Concerns about incompatibility with the CRPD could 
arise, even in a disability neutral concept of incapacity, if differential treatment on the basis of 
mental capacity had a disproportionate impact on people with disabilities,85 leading to an allegation 
of indirect discrimination on the basis of disability.86 This could amount to a breach of Article 12(2) 
                                                          
81 Dinerstein, above n 7, p 8. See also J. Dawson, ‘A Realistic Approach to assessing Mental Health Laws' 
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84 Bach, above n 6, p 5. 
85 Flynn, above n 19, p 497; E. Flynn and A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘Legislating Personhood: Realising the Right to 
Support in exercising Legal Capacity’ (2014) 10 Int. J.L.C. 81, p 87. 
86 CRPD, Arts 2, 5 and 12. See W. Martin et.al., ‘Achieving CRPD Compliance. Is the Mental Capacity Act of 
England and Wales Compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities? If Not, What 
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(which reaffirms the right to equal enjoyment of legal capacity), read in conjunction with Article 5 
CRPD (which prohibits ‘all discrimination on the basis of disability’), including any discriminatory 
measure that has the ‘purpose or effect’ of interfering, inter alia, with the right to equal recognition 
before the law.87 However, the incapacity defence in contract law could be objectively justified 
within this framework. Whilst the CRPD provides ‘no schema of defence against charges of indirect 
discrimination’,88 Martin et.al. note that the differential treatment which leads to a disproportionate 
impact on persons with disabilities may be permitted if based on reasonable and objective 
justifications and pursues a legitimate aim under the Convention.89 A measure that has 
disproportionate impact on people with disabilities must meet a three parts test to demonstrate that 
it serves ‘a legitimate aim’ under the CRPD, relies on an ‘objective basis’, which constitutes ‘a 
reasonable means’ for achieving the relevant aim.90  
 
The incapacity defence in contract law, if reconceptualised in light of the values pursued by the 
CRPD, could meet all three parts of this test. Firstly, such defence could pursue ‘a legitimate aim’, as 
the Convention seeks not only to empower people with disabilities (eg respect for individual 
autonomy)91 but also to protect individuals in situations of risk92 or exploitation.93 A broad reading of 
Article 11 (to include serious risk not confined to humanitarian emergencies) and Article 16 (to 
include passive exploitation), read in conjunction with Article 3(a) CRPD (respect for dignity) would 
support a framework which protects A who has entered into a grossly imbalanced transaction, 
without the mental capacity to understand its nature, in the absence of support such as independent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Next? An Essex Autonomy Project Position Paper’, Report submitted to the UK Ministry of Justice, 22 
September 2014, p 16. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Martin et.al, above n 101, p 7. 
89 Ibid. Martin et.al. support this conclusion with reference to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 20: ‘Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Art 2(2) ICESCR’, (2009), E/C.12/GC/20, para 13; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: 
‘Non-discrimination’ (1989), HRI/GsEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), para 13. 
90 Martin et.al, above n 101, p 7. 
91 CRPD, Art 3(a). 
92 Ibid, Art 11. 
93 Ibid, Art 16. See Martin et.al, above n 101, p 30. 
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legal advice and in the presence of passive unacceptable conduct from B. Secondly, a 
reconceptualised incapacity defence could rest on an objective basis. To be compatible with the 
CRPD ethos, this defence must move beyond A’s medical condition (and whether this was known by 
or apparent to B), to include an assessment of environmental factors such as the circumstances of 
the transaction. Finally, the basis of this defence could be a reasonable means for achieving a 
relevant aim. The CRPD provides little guidance on how to balance protection of individual autonomy 
with potential interventions to safeguard dignity.94 As highlighted by Martin et.al., ‘the core’ of the 
autonomy concept lies in the notion of self-determination’,95 but if A cannot understand the 
implications of a particular transaction, it is difficult to argue that A exercised autonomy to enter into 
that transaction.96 A reconceptualised incapacity defence in contract law could provide a safety net 
in such circumstances.  
 
The starting point should always be a presumption of contractual capacity and parties should have 
access to support in exercising capacity97 (eg accessible information,98 assistance with understanding 
the implications of a decision)99 and could include informal and formal support arrangements.100 
Support may be ‘particularly important’ when signing a contract, to enable informed decision 
making.101 The support for exercising legal capacity must, inter alia, respect A’s ‘rights, will and 
                                                          
94 Dawson, above n 81, p 71. 
95 Martin et.al, above n 101, p 9. 
96 Ibid. See also J. Craigie, ‘Against a Singular Understanding of Legal Capacity: Criminal Responsibility and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2015) 40 Int J Law Psychiatry 6, p 8. 
97 CRPD, Art 12(3). E. Flynn and A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or 
Fantasy?’ (2014) 32 Berk J Intl L 124, p 131.  
98 P. Gooding et.al, ‘Assistive Technology as Support for the exercise of Legal Capacity’ (2015) 29 Int'l 
Rev.L.Computers & Tech. 245, p 251; T. Minkowitz, ‘Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ in B. McSherry and P. Weller, Rethinking Rights-Based 
Mental Health Laws (Oxford: Hart 2010), p 160. 
99 L. Series, ‘Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and Support Paradigms’ (2015) 40 
Int’l J.L.& Psychiatry 80, p 85. 
100 ComRPD, General Comment No. 1, para 17. See W. Martin et.al., ‘Three Jurisdictions Report: Towards 
Compliance with CRPD Art. 12 in Capacity/Incapacity Legislation across the UK, An Essex Autonomy Project 
Position Paper’, 6 June 2016, p 52; Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, above n 51, p 476; Flynn, above n 19, p 498; 
Gooding, above n 51, p 46. 
101 A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘An Empowering Dependency: Exploring Support for the Exercise of Legal Capacity’ 
(2016) 18 Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 77, p 81. 
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preferences’, be free of conflicts of interest or undue influence and be ‘proportional and tailored’ to 
A’s circumstances.102 These safeguards seek to balance the objectives of empowerment and 
protection but fail to clarify  how to address ‘troubling situations’ where a person’s decision places 
him at a ‘serious risk’ that he does not understand.103 Such concerns should not be confined to risks 
involving personal safety but should also include situations where A’s decision to enter into a grossly 
imbalanced transaction places him at a serious financial risk that he does not understand. 
 
A further hurdle when seeking to defend the incapacity defence in contract law is encountered when 
evaluating such a defence in light of ComRPD’s interpretation of Article 12 CRPD.104 The arguments 
are likely to meet some difficulty, given the absolute stance adopted by ComRPD when insisting that 
mental capacity assessments based on functional tests (which may question whether A had the 
ability to use and weigh information and understand the implications of his decision), which may 
result on denial of legal capacity, are incompatible with Article 12.105 ComRPD focuses on the 
provision of support in exercising legal capacity, which should not ‘hinge on mental capacity 
assessments’.106 Furthermore, ComPRD stresses that everyone has legal standing (to hold rights) and 
legal agency (to exercise rights) and these strands cannot be separated.107  
 
ComPRD is correct in stressing that legal capacity comprises legal standing and legal agency, and in 
its insistence for supported decision making.108 Yet, whilst ComRPD focuses on the provision of 
support when this may be needed to exercise legal capacity and on the necessary safeguards within 
this framework of support, it fails to consider the position where decisions are taken outside this 
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framework of support by a party who lacks the mental capacity to understand the nature and 
consequences of his decision and the need for support, resulting in a grossly imbalanced transaction 
to his detriment. The need to respond to such concerns would justify, in exceptional circumstances, a 
departure from ComRPD’s ‘hard-line’ interpretation of Article 12,109 which goes much further than 
the Convention’s requirement for ensuring that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity ‘on an 
equal basis with others’.110 An incapacity defence in contract law available to all could play an 
important role in such circumstances. Abolishing this defence because of its potential implications for 
A’s legal agency in that particular transaction and because of its reference to functional aspects of 
mental capacity, would lead to ‘an impoverished legal system’.111 It would leave a vacuum that 
cannot be filled by other doctrines such as undue influence or unconscionability (as noted in the next 
section in the context of English contract law).  
 
Far from providing A with ‘an excuse’112 from his compliance with contractual obligations, a 
reconceptualised incapacity defence to reflect CRPD values would recognise the ‘relevance of both 
personal and environmental factors’ that affect decision making113 and would consider both 
economic and social interests. The concept of personhood that emerges from the Convention values 
individual autonomy and independence114 but also considers human diversity,115 universal human 
dignity116 and recognises the importance of support and interdependence between people117 to 
facilitate participation and inclusion.  
 
                                                          
109 S. Callaghan and C. Ryan, ‘An Evolving Revolution: Evaluating Australia's Compliance with the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Mental Health Law’ (2016) 39 U.N.S.Wales L.J. 596, p 604. 
110 CRPD, Art 12(2). See Dawson, above n 81, 73. 
111 Dawson, above n 81, 71-73. 
112 T. Minkowitz, ‘Rethinking Criminal Responsibility from a Critical Disability Perspective: The Abolition of 
Insanity/Incapacity Acquittals and Unfitness to Plead, and Beyond’ (2014) 23 Griffith L.Rev. 434, p 455. 
113 Ibid. See also K. Booth Glen, ‘Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and 
Beyond’ (2012) 44 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 93, p 98. 
114 CRPD, Art 3(a) and para (n) Preamble. 
115 Ibid, Art 3(d). 
116 Ibid, Arts 1 and 3(a). 
117 Ibid, Art 12(3). See Dhanda, above n 6, p 50. 
15 
The CRPD provides a benchmark to recognise, inter alia, the interdependence of people118 and the 
interconnection of rights, bringing together civil and political rights as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights, to create ‘hybrid rights’.119  When operating in the private sphere and entering into 
contracts, people should always be perceived as citizens, with all the economic, political and social 
values that this entails.120 Thus, citizenship values, including the protection of dignity, must permeate 
all areas of law, including contract law. Similar to the vision of contract law in Lorenzetti’s fourteenth 
century painting ‘Il Buon Governo’ (tr. the good government),121 as interpreted by Teubner,122 this 
area of law can embrace a multidimensional role (including economic and social spheres), reflecting 
the interrelatedness between public and private law and the interdependence of human beings 
bound together through contracts (a bond depicted as a rope running through people’s hands).123 In 
this strongly integrated society, the role of contract law is to facilitate private transactions and 
connect people in mutual relations.124 Whilst this vision contrasts with conventional approaches that 
reflect a unidimensional role for contract law (as facilitator of market transactions within the 
economic sphere and perceives individuals as economic actors in pursuit of self-interest),125 it is close 
to the inter-relational approach adopted by the CRPD, which provides a new lens for re-examining 
existing legal concepts.126 Seen through this lens, the concept of contractual capacity must take into 
account environmental factors such as the circumstances of the transaction and must consider 
alongside economic values, social values such as human dignity. 
 
Mental incapacity in English contract law: a tale of two innocents? 
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This section focuses on a narrow issue: the question of validity of contracts entered into between A 
(who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction) and B (who was unaware of the 
incapacity and acted in good faith). Whilst this is a narrow focus, it raises wider policy questions 
about the relevance of social values (including dignity) in an area of law currently dominated by 
economic values (concerned with the security of transactions). The discussion also adopts a narrow 
scope, examining in detail only the common law approach to this aspect of contractual capacity. 
Whilst recognising the relevance of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 in defining capacity 
regarding contracts for necessary goods and services127 and its potential influence in areas currently 
covered by the common law, 128 the discussion sees this influence as a two-way street. Given the 
impact of the common law in shaping section 7 MCA and in replicating the economic focus reflected 
in the common law jurisprudence,129 there is potential that a redefined concept of contractual 
capacity under the common law (considering both economic and social values and looking at the 
circumstances of the transaction) could influence positively the assessment of contractual capacity in 
areas governed by the MCA. Due to the focus of this discussion, the reference to contracts covered 
under the MCA (including contracts with parties whose property is subject to the control of the 
court130 and contracts for necessary goods and services)131 will be brief.132  
 
English contract law relies on a prima facie presumption that all adults have capacity to contract.133 
Consequently, a contract involving a party who lacked the mental capacity to understand the 
transaction would be valid unless, inter alia, this party’s property or affairs were subject to the 
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control of the court134 or the other party to the transaction had knowledge of the mental 
incapacity.135 Even if the contract falls within one of these exceptions and the subject matter involves 
a necessary good or service, the party alleging incapacity must still pay a reasonable price for these 
necessaries.136 Under the MCA test, a person is considered to lack capacity regarding a certain matter 
if, ‘at the material time’, he was ‘unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter, 
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’.137 Under the 
common law test, the party must prove that, at the time of entering into the contract, ‘he was so 
insane’ that ‘he did not know what he was doing’.138 The level of understanding required for 
upholding the validity of a transaction depends on the nature of that transaction.139 The MCA test for 
determining lack of capacity is ‘broadly consistent’ with the common law test140 and may be adopted 
even in cases not covered by this Act, if this is ‘appropriate’ and the courts have ‘regard to’ the 
existing common law principles.141 Parallels can be drawn between the MCA and the common law 
approaches in seeking to protect the interest of the person who lacked the mental capacity to 
understand the transaction.142 However, questions should be raised on the extent to which this 
protection is guided by a framework of citizenship values, including dignity. An effective 
interpretation of contractual capacity under common law that takes into account both economic and 
social factors and looks beyond the medical condition of individuals to consider the circumstances of 
the transaction, could act as a positive influence in the way capacity is constructed under the MCA. 
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The issue of mental incapacity in English contract law has been noted for its ‘topsy-turvy’ history.143 
Influenced by the approach adopted in Roman Law, Bracton’s thirteenth century account of English 
law noted that contracts with parties who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction 
were void.144 This provided complete protection to A who, in the absence of mental capacity to 
understand the contract, could not have consented to that transaction to voluntarily assume 
contractual obligations.145 However, as this approach allowed mere proof of incapacity to invalidate 
the contract, it was criticised for being subjective, encouraging fraudulent claims, undermining the 
security of transactions and failing to consider B’s interests.146 A few centuries later, the balance 
shifted to the other extreme. The desire to limit the opportunities where parties could escape their 
contractual obligations on grounds of mental incapacity coincided with the development of trading 
and commerce in England.147 Writing in the sixteenth century, Chief Justice Coke noted that no adult 
could avoid a contract by pleading his own incapacity (or ‘stultifying’ himself).148 This approach was 
the basis for the seventeenth century decision in Beverley’s case149 and ensured that A was 
‘absolutely liable for his alleged contract’.150 This provided certainty, protected B’s expectations and 
strengthened the security of transactions,151 but was criticised for going ‘too far’, ‘bringing about 
injustice’152 and being ‘absurd’ and ‘mischievous’, as it overlooked A’s interests.153 
 
Nineteenth century contract law witnessed an attempt to find a middle ground between the 
interests of both parties. In Moulton v. Camroux154 (Moulton), Pollock CB commented that the rule in 
Beverley’s Case ‘has been relaxed’ and that ‘unsoundness of mind’ could constitute a good defence 
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to set aside a contract if A could show that he lacked the capacity to enter into a contract and this 
was known by B.155 However, courts would not set aside a contract if B was unaware of the 
incapacity and contracted fairly and in good faith, the contract was executed and the parties could 
not be restored to their original position.156 On appeal, this decision was affirmed in the Exchequer 
Chamber by Patteson J.157 While Pollock CB noted that courts would not set aside a contract where B 
was unaware of the incapacity and contracted fairly, he did not state explicitly that the unfairness of 
a contract could justify invalidating it, irrespective of B’ knowledge.158 The focus on the security of 
transactions was made clear in Imperial Loan v Stone159 (Imperial Loan), where fairness was 
mentioned briefly in only one of the three judgements delivered in the Court of Appeal. Lopes LJ 
stated that ‘to avoid a fair contract on grounds of insanity’, A had to prove both his own mental 
incapacity and B’s knowledge of the incapacity.160 Yet, Lopes LJ did not state explicitly that fairness 
was a condition for enforcing a contract and that an unfair contract could be set aside irrespective of 
whether B was aware of the incapacity.161 Unlike Lopes LJ, Fry LJ and Lord Esher MR made no 
reference to fairness in their judgements. Both judgements indicated that B’s knowledge of A’s 
mental incapacity was an essential element for rendering a contract voidable. Furthermore, Lord 
Esher noted that in the absence of such knowledge, the contract was valid irrespective of whether it 
was executory or executed.162 To prove his lack of capacity at the time of entering into a contract, A 
must show that ‘he was so insane…that he did not know what he was doing’.163 A must prove both 
his lack of capacity and that B ‘knew him to be so insane as not to be capable of understanding what 
he was about’.164 This set a high threshold for invalidating a contract for want of capacity. 
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Whilst twentieth century contract law revisited the question of balance between the interests of A 
and B, the approach adopted in Imperial Loan remained prevalent. In York Glass v Jubb165 (York 
Glass), the Court of Appeal considered the question whether a contract concluded between A and B 
could be invalidated for being unfair. Although the case did not require this issue to be decided, 
Sargant LJ indicated that his mind was ‘entirely open’ to that question.166 However, he did not go as 
far as saying that the unfairness of a transaction could justify setting it aside. The Privy Council 
decision in Hart v O'Connor167 (Hart) confirmed the Imperial Loan approach and the preference for 
upholding the security of transactions. Lord Brightman rejected the conclusions reached by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Archer v Cutler168 (Archer), where McMullin J. stated that earlier decisions 
(including the judgements of Pollock CB in Moulton, Lopes LJ in Imperial Loan and Sargant LJ in York 
Glass) implied that an unfair transaction could be invalidated for want of capacity, irrespective of B’s 
knowledge of the incapacity.169 Lord Brightman considered the fairness-based approach adopted in 
Archer as being ‘illogical’ and ‘unsupported by authority’, and expressed concerns about its 
divergence from Australian and English contract law.170 In assessing the validity of a contract 
between A and B, the ‘unfairness’ of the transaction did not constitute a ground for rendering the 
contract voidable, ‘unless such unfairness amounts to equitable fraud’.171 The emphasis on B’s 
knowledge of the incapacity as a condition for rendering the contract voidable seeks to protect B 
from hardship and reflects a preference for holding parties to their agreements.172 This approach can 
be defended for its focus on certainty and clear rules to facilitate transactions and for upholding the 
security of transactions. Yet, far from providing a ‘middle course’ that seeks to protect the interests 
of both parties,173 this approach can be criticised for being ‘harsh’ on A.174 It places insufficient 
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weight on A’s interests and fails to assess the hardship caused to A by upholding a transaction that A 
entered into whilst lacking the mental capacity to understand its nature.175 The rule adopted in 
Imperial Loan and confirmed in Hart may protect B from hardship, but it fails to ‘look at the other 
side of the picture’,176 resulting in an imbalanced approach.  
 
The requirement imposed in Imperial Loan on A to prove both his lack of capacity and B’s knowledge 
of it, places a ‘heavy burden’ on A, particularly given the increased number of contracts where 
parties do not meet face to face.177 Furthermore, Imperial Loan makes no reference to ‘the character 
or degree of insanity’ required to fall within the protection of the incapacity defence.178 In addition, 
unlike Moulton, the decision in Imperial Loan makes no distinction between executory and executed 
contracts and the validity of a contract is upheld even in cases where restitutio in integrum is 
possible.179 A may also be seen to be in need of protection.180 As Lord Millett noted in Barclays Bank 
v Schwartz,181 mental incapacity may not only deprive A ‘of understanding the transaction, but also 
deprives him of the awareness that he [does] not understand it’.182 When compared to B, A is ‘in an 
unequal bargaining position’ when negotiating a contract183 and in a weaker position to protect his 
interests.184 Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that A gave his free consent to enter into a legally 
binding agreement.185 Contracts are voluntary agreements entered into by parties who give their 
free consent to be bound.186 Imperial Loan and Hart failed to place sufficient weight on these 
principles and focused instead on holding parties to their agreements for the ‘convenience of 
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trade’.187 The other party’s knowledge of the incapacity is not considered crucial when assessing the 
validity of contracts with minors.188 At common law, such contracts are generally voidable (with a 
few exceptions, including contracts for necessary goods and services, for apprenticeships, education 
and services) and are not binding on the minor, but are binding on the other party.189 Commenting 
on the courts’ readiness to set aside such contracts, Goudy is right to question why the minor is 
preferred to the person lacking mental capacity.190 Moreover, while Imperial Loan and Hart consider 
B’s knowledge of the mental incapacity to be essential for setting aside a contract, such knowledge is 
not required in other jurisdictions, including Scotland.191 
 
If A cannot set aside a contract by showing that B was aware of A’s mental incapacity, Imperial Loan 
and Hart allow the possibility for the contract to be set aside on other grounds, including undue 
influence or unconscionability. These grounds of relief are available to any contracting party, 
irrespective of mental capacity. Judging the validity of these contracts by the same standards, 
without regard to the mental capacity of the contracting parties, may provide ‘an attractive 
simplicity’.192 However, as Hudson rightly comments, this places A at a ‘serious disadvantage’ when 
compared with B.193 The fact that A must show, as required in Imperial Loan, that ‘he did not know 
what he was doing’,194 may ‘prevent him from giving vital evidence’ for any allegations of undue 
influence or unconscionability involving B.195 As noted by Hudson, ‘in providing his extreme mental 
impairment’, A ‘would simultaneously disable himself from giving credible evidence’ regarding B’s 
actions ‘at the time of the transaction’.196 Furthermore, the failure to show B’s knowledge of the 
mental incapacity, which would prevent A from relying on the incapacity defence, may also prevent A 
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from relying on undue influence or unconscionability. If A seeks to rely on undue influence in the 
case of a relationship of influence and a transaction not readily explained by the parties’ 
relationship,197 but where B acted in good faith, Bigwood comments that A must also show that B 
had actual knowledge of A’s mental incapacity.198 Similarly, if unconscionability is pleaded by A when 
B acted in good faith, Devenney and Chandler note that passive unacceptable conduct can be 
attributed to B only if B had knowledge of A’s incapacity.199 Consequently, despite the availability of 
potential grounds of relief such as undue influence or unconscionability, if A is unable to show that B 
was aware of the incapacity, A is left unprotected.200 Yet, A should be entitled to a greater degree of 
protection than it was envisaged under the Imperial Loan framework. 
 
In Archer, the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised the importance of safeguarding A’s interests. 
In a decision that ‘clearly diverged’ from the approach confirmed in Imperial Loan,201 Archer 
established that in assessing the validity of a contract entered into by a party who lacked the mental 
capacity to understand its nature, courts should consider not only if B was aware of the incapacity, 
but also, irrespective of B’s knowledge, whether the agreement was ‘unfair’ to A.202 Factors which 
could indicate unfairness and which must be assessed objectively include the absence of 
independent legal advice for A, disparity in the parties’ mental capacities, leading to an unequal 
bargaining position and a sale for a price significantly below the market value.203 Despite the absence 
of such classification in Archer, the first two factors could be associated with procedural fairness 
(concerned with the manner in which the contract was formed), whilst the latter could be equated 
with a concern for substantive fairness (focused on the contract terms).204 McMullin J.’s ‘indicia of 
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unfairness’ adopted in Archer mirrored the test of an unfair bargain considered in York Glass. Yet, 
unlike York Glass, the judgement in Archer was explicit in stating that a contract entered into by a 
person who lacked the mental capacity to understand its nature could be invalidated on grounds of 
its unfairness. In Archer, fairness prevailed over concerns for the security of transactions. 
Nevertheless, this victory for fairness was short-lived, as the subsequent decision in Hart saw a 
return to the traditional approach established in Imperial Loan. In Hart, Lord Brightman looked 
critically at the unfairness factors considered in Archer, arguing that McMullin J. dealt ‘indifferently’ 
with procedural and substantive fairness.205 Yet, when rejecting the fairness approach adopted in 
Archer, Lord Brightman focused explicitly on substantive unfairness (or ‘contractual imbalance’)206 
and failed to engage sufficiently with the issue of procedural unfairness.207 
 
The rejection of substantive fairness in Hart comes as little surprise. This concept is vulnerable to 
criticism for being uncertain, difficult to define and lacking a clear scope.208 Tiplady highlights the risk 
if this concept becomes an end in itself in contract law, ‘judges will begin to make choices which they 
are ill equipped to make’, with unpredictable consequences.209 In Tiplady’s words, there is a danger 
that ‘though they know the word to start the sorcerer’s broom, they will be unable to control it’.210 
Reliance on substantive fairness as a ground for assessing the validity of a contract is also considered 
to challenge the principle of freedom of contract.211 Lord Denning’s attempt in Lloyds Bank v 
Bundy212 to establish a fairness threshold for assessing the validity of contracts, when there is 
imbalance in the parties’ bargaining position,213 received little support in subsequent cases and was 
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disapproved by Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank v Morgan.214 Substantive fairness may, 
in reality, play an important role in assessing the validity of contracts but this has, so far, been 
‘disguised’.215 Atiyah is correct to express concern that ‘the extreme reluctance of courts to 
acknowledge openly’ that substantive fairness is considered when evaluating the validity of a 
contract ‘often obscures what is actually going on’.216 On a similar note, Chen-Wishart comments 
that ‘judicial articulations do not accurately reflect judicial actions’,217 implying a ‘mass deception’ by 
the courts when they insist that they are unconcerned with substantive fairness.218 Yet, courts 
remain reluctant to evaluate openly the fairness of contract terms and, as Morgan suggests, ‘perhaps 
honesty, in this instance, would be dangerous if it led to a general judicial power to regulate’ contract 
terms.219 Archer’s main failing consists in its failure to articulate clearly how its fairness-based regime 
would work in practice, the relation between procedural and substantive fairness as part of this 
framework and the confines within which this regime would operate. By merely providing indicators 
of unfairness that included both procedural and substantive factors, without distinguishing between 
the two or articulating the limits of this proposed regime, Archer opened up the possibility that 
substantive unfairness alone may constitute a ground for invalidating a contract entered into with a 
party who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction. In an attempt to redress the 
imbalance created by Imperial Loan, which failed to provide effective protection to A’s interests, 
Archer proposed a big step which proved too daring and ultimately resulted into a fall. 
 
The twenty-first century decision of the Supreme Court in Dunhill v Burgin220 (Dunhill) provides 
reasons for cautious optimism that a middle ground can be found between the interests of A and B. 
In this decision, Lady Hale noted that B’s knowledge of incapacity required in Imperial Loan was not 
                                                          
214 National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] AC 686, [707]. 
215 Thal, above n 210, pp 19-21. 
216 P. Atiyah, ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’ (1985) 35 UTLJ 1, p 9. 
217 M. Chen-Wishart, ‘The O’Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness' (1997) 56 CLJ 60, p 64. 
218 J. Morgan, Great Debates in Contract Law (London: Palgrave, 2nd edn, 2015), p 213. 
219 Ibid, p 214. 
220 Dunhill v Burgin, above n 48. 
26 
limited to actual knowledge and that A could avoid a contract by showing that B ‘ought to have 
known’ about the incapacity.221 Lady Hale presented the inclusion of both actual and constructive 
knowledge as the ‘generally accepted’ approach,222 and this understanding was not contested by the 
other four Supreme Court justices (Lords Kerr, Dyson, Wilson and Reed), who agreed with Lady Hale’s 
judgement. The inclusion of constructive knowledge brings the advantage of objectivity,223 as it 
allows questioning whether the reasonable person in B’s position would have known about the 
incapacity.224 It also has the potential to balance the interests of A and B, because it extends the 
grounds where A could invalidate a contract for want of capacity (not limited to B’s actual knowledge 
of the incapacity to include constructive knowledge) but continues to operate within limited confines 
(as some degree of knowledge is still required from B). In doing so, Dunhill avoids the pitfalls of the 
approach in Archer. 
 
Whilst Lady Hale’s comments in Dunhill have the potential to facilitate a balanced approach in cases 
involving contracts where A alleges mental incapacity, this matter is far from being settled. Lady 
Hale’s interpretation of the Imperial Loan rule has been attacked for potentially resting on an unclear 
basis.225 A narrow interpretation of Lady Hale’s comments, where B may be fixed with constructive 
knowledge only when the incapacity is apparent, but where actual knowledge is required where the 
incapacity is not apparent, is believed to be in line with earlier authorities.226 However, such an 
interpretation would be ‘limited in its extent’ and restricted in its significance.227 On the other hand, 
a broader interpretation of Lady Hale’s formulation, where B is fixed with constructive knowledge 
when the circumstances surrounding the transaction put him ‘on notice of the possibility’ of mental 
incapacity, and he did not take steps to ‘avoid being fixed with constructive knowledge’, would 
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extend the significance of Lady Hale’s statement, but would face challenges for resting on less clear 
authorities.228 Yet, such authority could be found in York Glass, where Warrington LJ stated that ‘if 
circumstances are proved which are such’ that any reasonable person in B’s position ‘would have 
inferred from these circumstances’ that A lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction, 
B ‘would be taken to know’ about the incapacity, even in the absence of actual knowledge.229 The 
strength of this authority for supporting a broad interpretation of Lady Hale’s formulation in Dunhill 
should not be weakened by the fact that reliance on York Glass ‘formed part of the alleged distinct 
and (possibly) equitable wider ground of avoidance on the basis of unfairness rejected by the Privy 
Council’ in Hart.230 Archer failed because it could have opened up the possibility for substantive 
fairness alone to justify invalidating a contract with a party who lacked the mental capacity to 
understand the transaction. Even in its broader interpretation, Lady Hale’s formulation in Dunhill 
cannot be equated with such proposition. 
 
Lady Hale’s interpretation of the Imperial Loan rule to include both actual and constructive 
knowledge, and the potential significance of a broad understanding of constructive knowledge to 
include the circumstances of the transaction, would provide a welcome degree of balance between 
the interests of A and B. However, enthusiasm must be tempered by an acknowledgement of the 
context in which Lady Hale put forward her remarks.231 In Dunhill, the Supreme Court was asked to 
decide, inter alia, whether the validity of a settlement of claim between a party who lacked the 
mental capacity to understand its nature and another party who was unaware of the incapacity, was 
determined by the general rule in Imperial Loan, or whether it was subject to the Civil Procedure 
Rules (CPR) (which required the court’s approval to be valid).232 The Supreme Court held that the 
validity of such settlement of claim is to be determined in accordance with the CPR, rather than by 
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reference to the Imperial Loan rule, and Lady Hale’s remarks about the latter were expressed 
obiter.233 However, despite the context of Lady Hale’s remarks, their significance cannot be 
undermined. In Josife v Summertrot Holdings,234 Lady Hale’s interpretation of the Imperial Loan rule 
was presented by the High Court as an accurate statement of the law for assessing the validity of 
contracts which fall under this rule.235 
 
The broad interpretation of Lady Hale’s formulation in Dunhill, which would allow a contract to be 
invalidated for want of capacity when B ought to have known about the incapacity from the 
circumstances of the transaction involves significant practical challenges.236 Such a reading of Lady 
Hale’s interpretation of the Imperial Loan rule could require the courts ‘to work out the 
circumstances’ in which B ‘should have known’ of A’s mental incapacity237 and this may prove 
particularly challenging in cases where the parties are not dealing face to face.238 Parallels have been 
drawn with the ‘considerable litigation’ regarding constructive notice in undue influence cases, 
following the House of Lords decision in Barclays Bank v O'Brien.239 On a similar note, a constructive 
knowledge test in incapacity cases ‘could lead to certain types of factual circumstance’ which would 
put B on notice about the possibility of A’s mental incapacity, and which may be avoided ‘by 
investigation or third party advice’.240 The use of constructive knowledge in Canada, as part of the 
test for invalidating contracts on grounds of incapacity, illustrates that such challenges are not 
insurmountable.241 A three part test requires courts to consider whether A lacked mental capacity at 
the time of the contract, whether due to this condition, ‘he was not capable of understanding the 
terms of the transaction and of forming a rational judgment of its effect upon his interests’ and 
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whether B had actual or constructive knowledge of such incapacity.242 In assessing the latter part of 
the test, the courts may consider whether the circumstances surrounding the transaction ‘ought to 
have put’ B on inquiry regarding A’s mental incapacity.243 
 
A broad reading of Lady Hale’s formulation in Dunhill would permit A to invalidate a contract on 
grounds of incapacity if A could show (i) B’s actual knowledge of the incapacity, or (ii) B’s constructive 
knowledge of the incapacity, if this was apparent or (iii) B’s constructive knowledge of the incapacity, 
based on the circumstances of the transaction. The first two grounds involve fairness in its 
procedural form, as B either knew of the incapacity but decided to go ahead with the contract 
regardless of the lack of consent, or turned a blind eye to what any reasonable person would have 
recognised as incapacity, to secure the transaction despite the lack of consent. Such reliance on 
procedural unfairness is also present in Imperial Loan, although not explicitly articulated. The last of 
these grounds could involve fairness in both its procedural and substantive form, but unlike Archer 
(which could have opened up the possibility for substantive unfairness alone to justify invalidating a 
contract), unfairness based on the circumstances of the transaction could require either procedural 
unfairness alone, or substantive unfairness combined with procedural unfairness. If the trigger for 
assessing the unfairness of a transaction is based on substantive factors (eg grossly imbalanced 
contract terms to A’s detriment),244 this would need to be supported by procedural factors (eg the 
absence of independent legal advice). Consequently, B would be fixed with constructive knowledge 
of the incapacity based on the circumstances of the transaction, not by reliance on substantive 
unfairness alone, but by reference to either procedural unfairness alone, or substantive unfairness in 
conjunction with procedural unfairness. 
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Such an approach could be accommodated within the current parameters of English contract law. It 
would not rely on a general principle of fairness, but rather be part of a piecemeal approach to 
ensure fairness, which is already a feature of English contract law. As noted by  Bingham LJ in 
Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes,245 English law has ‘developed piecemeal 
solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness’.246 Furthermore, such an approach 
would not undermine the importance of certainty in English contract law. B would be fixed with 
constructive knowledge of incapacity based on the circumstances of the transaction, only within a 
clearly defined framework which would establish when the substantive unfairness trigger would 
come into play (eg grossly imbalanced transactions to A’s disadvantage) and only when there is also 
proof of procedural unfairness (eg passive exploitation by B).247 A broad interpretation of Lady Hale’s 
formulation in Dunhill would not undermine freedom of contract, as it would be equated with a 
justifiable intervention in the parties’ contractual relations. Jessel MR’s discussion of freedom of 
contract adopted in Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson248 states that adults 
with ‘competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting’ and ‘their contracts 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced’ by courts.249 
Interventions may be justified when a contract has been entered unto in the absence of such 
understanding due to mental incapacity, the obligations are not voluntarily assumed due the absence 
of consent and B had actual or constructive knowledge of the incapacity. Only a ‘particularly rigid 
conception’ of freedom of contract understands this principle to mean ‘unrestricted freedom to 
make contracts’, irrespective of moral considerations that ‘cry out for the imposition of some 
restrictions’250 and understands the role of contract law as limited to enforcing the parties’ 
agreements.251 As Kimel correctly notes, a rigid conception of freedom of contract is ‘highly 
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unrealistic’, given the many forms in which the law intervenes to protect ‘vulnerable contracting 
parties’.252 The function of contract law is not limited to enforcing the parties’ agreements, but 
includes, inter alia, the prevention of ‘certain kinds of harm’, considering values such as fairness.253  
 
Questions concerning the validity of a contract between A and B may require courts to make a choice 
not only between two innocents, but also between two competing policies. They may involve a 
choice between releasing A from a transaction concluded without the mental capacity to understand 
its nature and to consent to it, balanced against upholding the security of transactions. A broad 
interpretation of Lady Hale’s formulation in Dunhill may be seen to undermine ‘the practical need for 
commerce to take place without traders and others requiring to consider the mental incapacity of 
their contracting parties where it is not apparent’.254 Nevertheless, a framework which considers the 
circumstances of the transaction and includes reference to grossly imbalanced contacts, may not be 
that objectionable. In fact, ‘legal intervention over one sided bargains’ may have considerable social 
benefits,255 as it may lead to a reduction in ‘extreme claims in negotiations’ and an increase in the 
number of contracts that parties are willing to enter into, resulting in ‘a wealthier society’.256  
 
An emphasis on social values would skew the balance between the narrow and broad reading of Lady 
Hale’s formulation in Dunhill in favour of the latter. While the narrow interpretation reflects 
individualist values focused on leaving parties to look after their own interests, the broad 
interpretation of Lady Hale’s statement reflects concern for wider community values, including 
fairness.257 It also moves the focus away from an individual-centred approach (assessing A’s mental 
incapacity and whether this was known by, or apparent to B), to consider the environment in which 
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the transaction was conducted (eg the gross imbalance of consideration, the absence of independent 
legal advice and whether courts should enforce such a transaction). Parallels can be drawn with 
discussions in the context of undue influence and unconscionability, which resist approaches centred 
only on A’s absent consent or B’s wrongful conduct, consider wider norms that govern how 
contracting parties should treat each other258 and assess the circumstances when the state would 
consider ‘an exploitive contract’ as ‘an unworthy endeavour to support’ and enforce.259 
 
A broad reading of Lady Hale’s statement in Dunhill becomes even more significant if we consider 
wider social factors. For example, a contract entered into by an elderly person who experiences 
memory loss (which could potentially be associated with a form of dementia) is likely to be 
problematic.260 McKendrick comments that such a situation raises ‘an acute conflict of policy’, as the 
need to protect such parties from exploitation must be weighed against the ‘wish not to infantilise 
the elderly’.261 The number of cases involving contracts with parties who may lack the mental 
capacity to understand the nature of the transaction is likely to grow, including because of an 
increase in the number of people who develop mental health conditions such as dementia.262 
Hudson correctly notes that in a legal framework where courts place more weight on upholding the 
security of transactions over considerations of fairness, the family members of such contracting 
parties may be tempted to take the management of financial affairs out of their hands, risking 
‘tension and distress’.263 A vision of contract law which overlooks fairness-based considerations and 
wider social concerns is unlikely to provide a satisfactory response to such situations.264  
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Quo vadis: the story retold or a new story? 
 
The CRPD has sparked the need to re-examine legal concepts in light of legal values pursued by the 
Convention, including the protection of human dignity. The exercise of universal legal capacity can 
operate more effectively in a legal framework where parties can rely, when appropriate, on legal 
concepts such as an incapacity defence in contract law that reflects not only economic but also social 
values. As Collins accurately states, ‘principles such as respect for the liberty and dignity of the 
individual’ should influence not only the public sphere, but should also ‘guide all legal regulation of 
civil society’.265 Once private law is perceived as ‘a form of social regulation’, it becomes legitimate to 
question whether particular concepts protect adequately individual autonomy and dignity.266 Collins 
concedes that the interplay between human rights law and private law could either lead private law 
to become more receptive ‘to arguments about fairness’ or stimulate instead ‘a restatement of a 
more liberal, laissez-faire approach in private law’, but that ‘both directions of development seem to 
be on the cards’.267 A key factor that may skew the outcome in favour of the former approach is the 
ability to develop ‘a balancing mechanism suitable for contract law’ that protects rights without 
undermining freedom of contract.268 This article has sought to identify this balancing mechanism 
with regards to contractual capacity. 
 
The law regarding the validity of contracts entered into between A (who lacked the mental capacity 
to understand the nature of the transaction) and B (who was unaware of the incapacity and acted in 
good faith), has been described as ‘a battleground’ of conflicting policies.269 The most appropriate 
response in such circumstances is a balanced approach that protects the interests of both parties to 
the transaction. Yet, the history of this area of law has witnessed a shift from extreme responses 
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(which protected the interests of only one of the parties), to imbalanced approaches. The 
predominant approach, based on the nineteenth century Court of Appeal decision in Imperial Loan, 
illustrates such imbalance. In a desire to uphold the security of transactions, this decision has left A 
with a very high threshold to invalidate the contract for want of capacity. This approach, which fails 
to place sufficient weight on A’s lack of consent,270 seems to require him to show not only his 
incapacity to understand the transaction, but also B’s knowledge of it.271 In an attempt to redress this 
imbalance, the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in Archer permitted contracts to be invalidated 
for want of capacity, irrespective of B’s knowledge, if the contract was unfair.272 However, this 
decision failed to articulate the practical implications of an unfairness test and left B with insufficient 
means to protect his interests, resulting in yet another imbalanced approach. Archer ultimately failed 
due to its over-ambition.273 By opening up the possibility for substantive unfairness alone to 
invalidate the transaction, Archer went too far, seeking to disrupt too much of the current 
parameters of contract law. 
 
The Supreme Court decision in Dunhill provides hopes that a middle ground can be found to protect 
the interests of both A and B. These hopes rest on Lady Hale’s interpretation of the Imperial Loan 
rule, confirming that B’s knowledge of incapacity is not limited to actual knowledge and can include 
constructive knowledge.274 Unlike Archer, this reflects a more realistic attempt to balance the 
interests of both contracting parties, based on a small but potentially significant step and working 
within the current parameters of English contract law. Hopefully, subsequent cases will clarify the 
meaning of constructive knowledge in a way that would secure a balanced approach between the 
interests of both contracting parties. It is important to exercise cautious optimism, as Lady Hale’s 
formulation of the Imperial Loan rule is open to two potential interpretations. A narrow 
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understanding of constructive knowledge (limited to situations where incapacity is apparent)275 
would bring no significant changes and would merely retell the tale of imbalance associated with 
Imperial Loan. On the other hand, a broad interpretation of constructive knowledge (to include 
situations where B ought to have known about the incapacity, due to the circumstances of the 
transaction) would signal the beginning of a new story. This would be a story rooted on an existing, 
but insufficiently explored legal basis,276 setting the basis for a more balanced approach to protect 
the interests of both contracting parties. Lady Hale’s dictum in Dunhill has brought this tale of two 
innocents to a key point. A narrow interpretation would be a step in the wrong direction. It would be 
a retrograde step for twenty-first century contract law, at a time when measures to protect the 
dignity of persons who lacked mental capacity are moving forward. 
 
A reinterpretation of the Imperial Loan rule could also have implications for the law of agency, and 
may prove relevant when re-evaluating the potential of this area of law to provide a legal framework 
for some forms of supported decision making.277 While an assessment of these implications is 
outside the scope of this article, it is important to draw a brief parallel between the tale of two 
innocents discussed above and the more complex framework of an agency agreement,278 which 
could potentially involve three innocent parties.279 The interplay between economic and social 
concerns is also manifested in this context,280 although the balance seems focused on protecting A’s 
interests, with limited protection conferred to the agent or the third party who transacted with A 
through an agent. 
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The Court of Appeal decisions in Drew v Nunn281 (Drew) and Yonge v Toynbee282 (Yonge) suggest that 
A’s mental incapacity would terminate a contract of agency, rendering it void, irrespective whether 
the agent had knowledge of the incapacity.283 This view is also reflected in some of the earlier 
editions of Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency,284 indicating that the Imperial Loan rule does not 
apply to agency agreements and to contracts concluded by the agent on behalf of the principal.285 
The agent may have apparent authority to bind the principal286 or may be liable to the third party for 
breach of warranty of authority.287 Whilst an exception from the Imperial Loan rule may seek to 
protect A’s interests, a void contract overlooks A’s will and preferences regarding the transaction. 
However, in the twentieth edition of Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, Watts notes that the 
Imperial Loan rule should apply to agency agreements and that the other party (eg agent or third 
party)’s knowledge of incapacity could render the contract voidable.288 Furthermore, Higgins 
suggests that Drew289 and Yonge290could be confined to their facts.291 
 
This area of law has been described as unsettled292 and ‘in a state of some confusion’,293 requiring 
‘fresh examination’.294 Reconsideration was not offered in Dunhill (where the Supreme Court 
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considered it ‘fortunate’ that the issue did no need to be addressed)295 and Blankley (where the 
Court of Appeal noted that it was unnecessary ‘to grasp the “hot potato” left on one side by the 
Supreme Court in Dunhill’).296 A potential response would be to confirm that the Imperial Loan rule 
extends to agency agreements.297 Yet, when the opportunity to re-examine this area of law does 
arise, a strict interpretation of the Imperial Loan rule may offer an unattractive alternative, as it 
provides an imbalanced approach to A’s detriment.298 On the other hand, a reinterpretation of the 
Imperial Loan rule (to provide a balanced approach between the interests of the contracting parties, 
to include constructive knowledge based on the circumstances of the transaction and to consider 




The recognition of universal legal capacity under Article 12 CRPD plays a key contribution to the 
paradigm shift in perceiving persons with disabilities from objects of care to subjects of rights,299 
from paternalism to empowerment, from substituted to supported decision-making300 and from 
exclusion to inclusion in all aspects of life.301 It enables everyone to participate in society, to enter 
into legally binding agreements and have these recognised.302 The CRPD is less clear on the 
demarcation between the concepts of legal and mental capacity and on the compatibility between 
universal legal capacity and the incapacity defence303 in areas such as contract law. This led some 
jurisdictions to consider whether, in light of the CRPD, there is a need to move away from the 
incapacity defence in contract law, as questions concerning the validity of contracts can be assessed 
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with reference to doctrines such as unconscionability and undue influence.304 Yet, the incapacity 
defence in contract law can coexist with the notion of universal legal capacity advanced by the CRPD, 
as long as it can be invoked by anyone and disability and incapacity are not conceptually equated305 
and any disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities can be objectively justified as serving a 
legitimate aim under the CRPD, pursued through reasonable means.306 This article has called for an 
interpretation of contractual capacity which moves beyond the medical condition of individuals 
(whether this was known by or apparent to the other party to the transaction) and considers 
environmental factors (such as the circumstances of the transaction). The discussion has also 
stressed the need to redefine contractual capacity in a manner that addresses not only economic 
concerns (such as upholding the security of transactions) but also social values (including the 
protection of human dignity). These arguments were explored in the context of English contract law, 
with a focus on the question of assessing the validity of a contract between a party who lacked the 
mental capacity to understand the transaction and another party who was unaware of the incapacity 
and acted in good faith. This particular focus was chosen due to the policy implications of this 
question, requiring a reflection on the relevance of social values in a framework currently dominated 
by economic interests. The article sought to demonstrate not only how a redefined concept of 
contractual capacity can be accommodated within the parameters of English contract law, but also 
why this is important. The discussion highlighted the social arguments for legal intervention in the 
case of grossly imbalanced contracts307 and the important contribution that contract law can play in 
defining the wider social norms that govern how parties should treat each other.308 It has also 
stressed the potential increase in the number of parties which may seek to rely on the incapacity 
defence, including due to an increased number of people who develop mental health conditions such 
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as dementia309 and the need for an appropriate response from contract law which considers wider 
social concerns. Over the past decades, English contract law has witnessed a positive change in the 
language employed to refer to parties who lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction 
they entered into. While earlier cases referred to ‘lunatics’,310 more recent cases rightly refer to 
‘persons’.311 It is important that this positive change in language is matched by a redefined vision of 
the incapacity defence, which moves beyond the medical condition of individuals and considers the 
circumstances of the transaction. An assessment of the substantive and procedural fairness of the 
transaction may translate into the language of contract law a concern for wider social values and 
respect for human dignity.312 
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